%. 


V^.  \.a: 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


1^128 

150     "^^ 

^  Its, 


i.4 


2.5 
2.2 

2.0 

1.6 


^ 


/, 


f 


7. 


/A 


7 


Photographic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


33  WIST  MAIN  STRUT 

WEBSTIR.N.Y,  M5S0 

(716)  872-4503 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHIVI/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
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the  usual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


D 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I    Covers  damaged/ 


D 


Couverture  endommagde 


Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaurie  et/ou  pelliculde 


I      I    Cover  title  missing/ 


Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 


I      I    Coloured  maps/ 


D 


Cartes  giographiques  en  couleur 


Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 


□    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 
Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 


n^Bou 

L— I    Reli 


Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 


n 


D 


D 


Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  tnargin/ 

Lareliure  serr^a  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
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I      I   Coloured  pages/ 


Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
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□    Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Pages  restaurdes  et/ou  pelliculdes 

Lij  Pi 


ages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
Pages  ddcolordes,  tachet^et.  ou  piqu^es 


□    Pages  detached/ 
Pages  ddtach^es 

\~Zy  Showthrough/ 
L_J    Transparence 

I      I    Quality  of  print  varies/ 


Quality  inigale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  material/ 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppldmentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
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D 


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Les  pages  totalement  ou  partiellemcnt 
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This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Cm  document  est  filmi  au  taux  de  reduction  indiqu6  ci-dessous. 


10X 

14X 

18X 

22X 

26X 

30X 

y 

12X 


16X 


20X 


24X 


28X 


32X 


;m' 


The  copy  filmed  here  has  been  reproduced  thanks 
to  the  generosity  of: 

National  Library  of  Canada 


L'exemplaira  filmd  fut  reproduit  grdce  d  la 
g6n6rosit6  de: 

Bibliothdque  nationale  du  Canada 


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filming  contract  specifications. 


Les  images  suivantes  ont  6X6  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin,  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  et 
de  la  nettetd  de  I'exemplaire  fiimd.  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 


Original  copies  Iji  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimis  sont  film6s  en  commengant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
dernidre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'lllustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  selon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  film6s  en  commenpant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'lllustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  derniire  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  — <►  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED "),  or  the  symbol  y  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 


Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaftra  sur  la 
dernidre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — ►  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 


Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  dtre 
filmto  A  des  taux  de  reduction  diffdrents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  dtre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  ciichi,  il  est  filmd  d  partir 
de  I'angle  sup6rieur  gauche,  de  gauche  d  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  ndcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  m6thode. 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

6 

6 

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LETTER 


• 


«^•■ 


1  ^^i       >^^ 


TkOit    TUK 


liON.  TIMOTHY  PICKERING, 

A  SENATOR  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


•♦.  y   "  FROM  TBB  ','"*'^""'''      ",'**     ■< 


V*-  ■ '" 


STATE  OF  MASSACHUSETTS, 


EXHIBITING  TO  HIS  CONSTITUENTS 


<  --  ,.1 


"  s  ■ 


A  VIEW  OF  THE  IMMINENT  DANGER 


rip 


OF   AN 


1  .  (■;,-•. 


UNNECESSARY  AND  RUINOUS  WAR. 


ADDRESSED    TO 


MIS  EXCELLENCY  JAMES  SULLIVAN, 


COVBRNOB.  OP  TBS  tAID  JT^l, 


lOSTON : 
fKINTBO  Br  CKKBNOUaH  AND  tTtBHIfi, 


■MWM  IMIt  >»»M«f> 


1808. 


#*'?&■*  "H 


^,- 


TO  THE  READER. 


THE  following  is  a  publitk  Letter.  It  is  very  properly  addressed 
to  the  Govwrnor,  and  through  him  to  the  Legislature :  by  this  channel  it 
would  have  come  most  regulady  to  the  eye  of  the  whole  people.  It  is  not 
known  to  the  publishers  why  it  has  not  been  already  printed  for  the  use.  of 
the  pubUck  ;— whether  it  is  only  delayed,  or  intended  to  be  entirely  with- 
held. But  a  copy,  which  was  sent  from  Washington,  after  the  original,  to  a 
private  friend,  has  been  happily  obtained  for  the  press. 

If  at  this  day  any  honest  citiecn  can  doubt  of  the  great  credit  and 
weight  to  which  the  facts  and  opinions  of  the  Writer  are  fairly  entitled,  such 
citizen  is  referred  to  the  Writer's  enemies  for  information.  Among  these 
many  of  the  most  respectable  will  say,  that  his  pure  patriotism  and  intrepid 
publick  virtue  have  honoured  the  name  of  Republican  in  our  country,  ancl 
would  have  honoured  the  best  of  the  Romans,  in  the  best  days  of  Rome. 
A//MI,  Manh  9/£,  1808. 


CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  FEBRUARY  16,  I«ft§. 


SIR, 


IN  the  even  cuirent  of  ordinary  timei}  in 
addrefs-  from  a  Senator  in  Congrefs  to  his  conftituents  might  be 
difpenfed  with.  Ta  {iich  times,  the  proceedings  of  the  Executive 
and  Legiflatur^  of  the  United  States,  exhibited  in  their  ,^/tVi4^,rf 
Blight  be  fufficient.  But  the  prefent  fingular  condition  of  our 
country,  when  its  mod  interefting  concerns,  wrapt  up  in  myftery^ 
excite  univerfal  alarm,  requires  me  to  be  no  longer  filent.  Perhaps 
X  am  liable  to  cenfure,  at  fuch  a  crifis,  for  not  fooner  prefenting,  to 
you  and  them,  fuch  a  view  of  our  national  affairs  as  my  official  fitu* 
ation  has  placed  in  my  power.  I  now  addrefs  it  to  you,  Sir,  as  the 
proper  organ  of  communication  to  the  legiflature* 

The  attainment  of  truth  is  ever  defirable  :  and  I  cannot  per* 
mit  myfelf  to  doubt  that  the  ftatement  I  now  make  mull  be  accept* 
able  to  all  who  have  an  agency  in  direding  the  affairs,  and  who  are 
guardians  of  the  interefts  of  our  Common'o/ealth,  which  fo  materiaUy 
depend  on  the  meafures  of  the  Government  of  the  Nation.  At  the 
fame  time,  I  am  aware  of  the  jealoufy  with  which,  in  thefe  unhappy 
days  of  party  diffenfions,  my  communications  may,  by  fome  of  my 
conftituents,  be  received.  Of  this  I  will  not  complain  :  while  I 
earneftly  wiHi  the  fame  jealoufy  to  be  extended  towards  all  pub- 
lick  men.  Yet  I  may  claim  fome  (hare  of  attention  and  credit- 
that  (hare  which  is  due  to  the  man  who  defies  the  world  to  point, 
in  the  whole  courfe  of  a  long  and  pubUck  life,  at  one  inftance  of 
deception,  at  a  Angle  departure  from  truth. 


The  EMBARGO  demands  the  firil  notice.  For  perhaps  no  aft  of 
the  National  Government  has  ever  produced  fo  muoh  folicitude,  or 
fpr^ad  fuch  univqrfal  alarm,     Becaufe  all  naturally  conclude,  that  a 


meafure  pregnant  with  incalculable  mifchief  to  all  daffes  of  our  fel- 
low^itizens,  would  not  have  been  propofed  by  the  Prefident,  and 
adopted  by  Congrefs,  but  for  caufes  deeply  affeaing  the  int-refts 
and  fafety  of  the  nation.  It  mud  have  begi  under  the  influence  of 
this  opinion  that  the  legiflative  bodies  of  lome  States  have  expreff- 
ed  their  approbation  of  the  Embargo,  either  explicitly,  or  by  im- 
plication. 

The  following  were  all  the  papers  laid  by  the  Prefident  before 
Congrefs,  as  the  grounds  of  the  Embargo. 

1.  The  pmrlaoiatinn  of  the  King  of  Creat.Bntam  requiring  the 
return  of  his  fubjefts,  the  fcamen  efpecially,  from  foreign  countrie*, 
to  aid,  in  this  hour  of  peculiar  danger,  in  the  defence  of  their  own. 
But  it  being  an  acknowledged  principle,  that  every  nation  has  a 
right  to  the  fervice  of  its  fubjefts  in  time  of  war,  that  proclamation 
could  not  furnifli  the  flighteft  ground  for  an  Embargo. 


2.  The  extraft  of  a  letter  from  the  Grand  Judge  Regnier  to 
the  French  Attorney  General  for  the  Council  of  Prizes.  This 
contained  a  partial  interpretation  of  the  imperial  blockading  decree 
of  November  2 i,  1806.  This  decree,  indeed,  and  its  interpreta- 
tion, prefent  flagrant  violations  of  our  neutral  rights,  and  of  the  ex- 
ifting  treaty  becween  the  United  States  and  France  :  but  ftill,  the 
execution  of  that  decree  could  not  (from  the  fmall  number  of 
French  cruifers)  extenfively  interrupt  our  trade.  Thefe  two  pa- 
pers were  publick.  ' 

3.  The  letter  from  our  Minifter,  Mr.  Armftrong,  to  Mr.  Cham- 
pagny,  the  French  Minillcr  of  Foreign  Afltfiis  :   and 

4.  Mr.  Champagny's  anfwer.  Both  thefe  ought,  in  form  or 
fubftance,  alfo  to  have  been  made  publick.  The  latter  would  have 
furniflicd  to  our  nation  fome  idea  of  the  views  and  cxpedations  of 
France.  But  both  were  withdrawn  by  the  Prefident,  to  be  depof- 
ited  among  other  Executive  fecrets  :  while  neither  prefented  any 
aew  ground  to  juftify  an  Embargo.    ' 


& 


In  the  Senate,  thefe  papers  were  referred  to  a  committee.     The 
committee  quickly  reported  9.  bill  for  laying  an  Embargo,  agreea- 
bly to  the  Prefident's  propofal.     This  was  read  a  firft,  a   fecond, 
and  a  third  time,  and  pafled  ;  and  all  in  the  (hort  compafs  of  about 
four  hours  !     A  little  time  was  repeatedly  afked,  to  obtain  further 
information,  and  to  confider  a  meafure  of  fuch  moment,   of  fuch 
univerfal  concern  :  but  thefe  requefts  were  denied.     We  were  hur- 
ried into  the  paiTage  of  the  bill,  as  if  there  was  danger  of  its  being 
reje6led,  if  we  were  allowed  time  to  obtain  further  information, 
and  deliberately  confider  the  fubjeft.     For  to  that  time  our  veffeh 
were  freely  failing  on  foreign  voyages  ;  and  in  a  national  point  of 
view,  the  departure  of  half  a  do/en  or  a  dozen  more,  while  we  were 
inquiring  into  the  neceility  or  expediency  of  the  Embargo,  was  of 
little  moment.     Or  if  the  danger  to  our  veflels,  feamen  and  mer- 
chandize had  been  fo  extreme  as  not  to  admit  of  one  day's  delay, 
ought  not  that  extreme  danger  to  have  been  exhibited  to  Congrefs  ? 
The  Conftitution  which  requires  the  Prefident  "  to  give  to  Congrefs 
information  of  the  ftate  of  the  union,*'  certainly  meant,  not  partial, 
but  complete  information  on  the  fubjed^  of  a  communication,  fo  far 
as  he  poffeffed  it.     And  when  it  enjoins  him  "  to  recommend  to 
their  condderation  fuch  meafures  as  he  fhould  judge  neceifary  and 
expedient,"  it  as  certainly  intended  that  thofe  recommendations 
lliould  be  bottomed  on  information  communicated,   not  on  fa3s  with- 
held, and  locjced  up  in  the  Executive  cabinet.     Had  the  publick 
fafcty  been  at  ftake,  or  any  great  publick  good  been  prefented  to 
our  view,  but  which  would  be  left  by  a  moment*,  /'-lay;  there 
would  have  been  fome  apology  for  difpatch,  though  non<    for  a£ling 
nvUhout  due  information.     In  truth,  the  meafure  appeared  to  me 
then,  as  it  (lill  docs,  and  as  it  appears  to  the  publick,  without  a 
fufficit^nt  motive,  without  a  legitimate  objeft.     Hence  the  general 
inquiry — "  For  what  is  the  Embargo  laid  ?"     And  I  challenge 
any  man  not  in  the  fecrets  of  the  Executive  to  tell.     I  know.  Sir, 
that  the  Prefident  faid  the  papers  abovementioned  "  (howed  that 
great  and  increafing  dangers  threatened  our  veflels,  our  feamen,  and 
our  merchandize  :"  but   I  alfo  know  that  they  exhibited  no  netu 
dangers  ;  none  of  which  our  merchants  and  feamen  had  not  been 
well  apprized.     The  Britifh  proclamation  had  many  days  before 


U 

n 


been  publiflied  in  the  newfpapen  [the  copy  laid  before  us  by  the 
Prefident  had  been  cut  out  of  a  newfpaper  ;3  and  fo  had  the  fub> 
fiance,  if  not  the  words  of  Regnier's  letter.     Yet  they  had  excit- 
ed little  concern  among  merchants  and  feamen,  the  prefervation  of 
whofe  perfons  and  property  was  the  profejfed  obje6:  of  the  PreG- 
dent's  recommendation  of  an  Embargo.     The  merchants  and  fea^ 
men  could  accurately  eilimate  the  dangers  of  continuing  their  com- 
mercial operations  ;  of  which  dangers,  indeed,  the  adtual  premiums 
of  infurance  were  a  fatisfadtory  gauge.     Thofc  premiums  had  very 
little  increafed  :  by  the  Britifli  proclamation  not  a  cent :  and  by 
the  French  decree  fo  little  as  not  to  ftop  commercial  enterprises. 
The  great  numbers  of  veflels  loading  or  loaded,  and  prepared  for 
fea  ;  the  exertions  every  where  made,  on  the  firft  rumour  of  the 
Embargo,  to  difpatch  them  ;  demonflirate  the  Prefident's  dangers 
to  be  imaginary — to  have  been  ajfumed.     Or  if  great  and  real  dan- 
gers, unknown  to  commercial  men,  were  impending,  or  fure  to  fall* 
how  deiirable  was  it  to  have  had  them  officially  declared  and  publifli- 
ed !  This  would  have  produced  a  voluntary  embargo,  and  prevent- 
ed every  complaint.     Befides,  the  dangers  clearly  defined  and  un- 
derftood,  the  publick  mind  would  not  have  been  difquietcd  with  im- 
aginary fears,  the  more  tormenting,  becaufe  uncertain* 

It  is  true  that  confiderable  numbers  of  veflels  were  collcded  in 
our  ports,  and  many  held  in  fufpenfe  :  not,  however,  from  any.new 
dangers  which  appeared ;  but  from  the  myflerious  conduct  of  our 
aflairs,  after  the  attack  on  the  Chefapeakc  ;  and  from  the  painful 
apprehenflon  that  the  courfe  the  Prefident  was  purfuing  would  ter- 
minate in  war.  The  National  InteUigencer  (ufually  confidered 
as  the  Executive  newfpaper)  gave  the  alarm  ;  and  it  was  echoed 
through  the  United  States.  War,  probable  or  inevitable  war,  was 
the  conflant  theme  of  the  newfpaper  3,  and  of  the  converfations,  as 
was  reported,  of  perfons  fuppofed-to  be  beft  informed  of  Executive 
defigns.  Yet  amid  this  din  of  war,  no  adequate  preparations  were 
feen  making  to  meet  it.  The  order  to  detach  a  hundred  thoufand 
militia  to  fight  the  Britifli  navy  (for  there  was  no  appearance  of  an 
enemy  in  any  other  fliape)  was  fo  completely  abfurd,  as  to  excite, 
with  men  of  common  fenfe,  no  other  emotiou  than  ridicule.   .Kok 


..■»■: 


•■-;■*: 


the  ihadow  of  a  reafon  that  could  operate  on  the  mind  of  a  man  of 
common  underftanding  can  be  oifcred  in  its  juilification.  The  re- 
fufal  of  the  Britifli  officer  to  receive  the  frigate  Chefapeake  as  a 
pr'i%ei  when  tendered  by  her  commander,  is  a  demonftration  that  the 
attack  upon  her  was  exclufively  for  the  purpofe  of  taking  their 
deferters  ;  and  not  intended  as  the  commencement  of  a  war  be- 
tween the  two  nations.  The  Prefident  knew  that  the  Britiih  had 
no  invading  army  to  land  on  our  (hores  ;  and  the  detached  militia 
would  be  ufelefs,  except  againft  land-forces.  Why  then  was  this 
order  for  the  Militia  given  ? — The  nature  of  the  cafe,  and  the  aAu- 
al  (late  of  things,  authorize  the  inference,  that  its  immediate,  if  not 
its  only  object,  was  to  increafe  the  publick  alarm,  to  aggravate  the 
publick  refontnipnt  againft  Great- Britain,  to  excite  a  war  pulfe; 
and  in  the  height  of  this  artificial  fever  of  the  publick  mind,  whick 
was  to  be  made  known  in  Great-Britain,  to  renew  the  demands  on 
her  government ;  in  the  poor  expeflation  of  extorting,  in  that  ftate 
•f  things,  concefiions  of  points  which  (he  had  always  confidered  as 
her  rightst  and  which  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumflances,  (he 
had  uniformly  refufcd  to  relinquKh.  The  refult  of  the  fubfequent 
negociation  at  London  has  (hown  how  utterly  unfounded  was  the 
Prefident's  expe£katiun,  how  perfeAly  ufelefs  all  this  blufter  of  war. 
While  no  well  informed  man  doubted  that  the  Briti(h  Government 
would  make  fuitable  reparation  for  the  attack  on  the  Chefapeake. 
The  Preiidcnt  himfelf,  in  his  proclamation,  had  placed  the  affair  on 
that  footing.  A  rupture  between  the  two  nations,  faid  he,  **  is  c- 
qually  oppofed  to  the  interefts  of  both,  as  it  is  to  affurances  of  the 
moil  friendly  difpofitions  on  the  part  of  the  Britiih  Governmenty 
in  the  midft  of  which  this  outrage  was  committed.  In  this  light 
the  fubjeft  cannot  but  prefent  itfelf  to  that  Government,  and 
ftrengthen  the  motives  to  an  honourable  reparation  for  the  wrong 
which  has  been  done."  And  it  is  now  well  known  that  fuch  rep- 
aration might  have  been  promptly  obtained  in  London,  had  the 
Prefident  8  inftruftions  to  Mr.  Monroe  been  compatible  with  fuch 
an  adjuftment.  He  was  required  not  to  negociate  on  this  fingle, 
tranfient  aft  (which  when  once  adjufted  was  for  ever  fettled)  but 
in  connedion  with  another  claim  of  long  (landing,  and,  to  fay  the 
leaft,  of  doubtful  right ;  to  wit,  the  exemption  from  impreffment 


^ 


8 


of  BritUb  feamen  found  on  board  American  merchant  vcffels.  To 
remedy  the  evil  arifing  from  its  exercife,  by  which  our  own  citizeni 
were  fometimes  impreffed,  the  attention  of  our  Government,  under 
every  adminiftration,  had  been  eameftly  engaged  :  but  no  praftica- 
ble  plan  has  yet  been  contrived  :  while  no  man  who  regards  the 
truth,  will  qucilion  the  difpofition  of  the  Britifh  Government  to  a- 
dopt  any  arrangement  that  will  fecure  to  Great-Britain  the  fervices 
of  her  ovmfuhjeBs.  And  now,  when  the  unexampled  fituaticn  of 
that  country  (left  alone  to  maintain  the  conflict  with  France  and 
her  numerous  dependent  States — ^left  alone  to  withiland  the 
Power  which  menaces  the  liberties  of  the  world)  rendered  the  aid 
of  all  her  fubjedls  more  than  ever  needful ;  there  was  no  reafonable 
ground  to  expeA  that  (he  would  yield  the  right  to  take  them  when 
found  on  board  the  merchant  veflels  of  any  nation.  Thus  to  infill 
on  her  yielding  this  point,  and  infeparably  to  conneA  it  with  the 
affair  of  the  Chefapeake,  was  tantamount  to  a  determination  not  to 
negociate  at  all.     . 

I  write.  Sir,  with  freedom  ;  for  the  times  are  too  perilous  to  al- 
low thofe  who  are  placed  in  high  and  refponfible  fituations  to  be 
fdent  or  referved.  The  peace  and  fafety  of  our  country  are  fuf- 
pended  on  a  thread.  The  courfe  we  have  feen  purfued  leads  on  to 
war — to  a  war  with  Great-Britain — a  war  abfolutely  without  ne- 
ceflity — a  war  which  whether  difaftrous  or  fuccefsful,  mud  bring 
mifery  and  ruin  to  the  United  States  :  m'tfery  by  the  deftru6lion  of 
our  navigation  and  commerce  (perhaps  alfo  of  our  faircft  fca- 
port  towns  and  cities)  the  lofs  of  markets  for  our  produce,  the 
want  of  foreign  goods  and  manufaftures,  and  the  other  evils  inci- 
dent to  a  ftate  of  war :  and  ruin^  by  the  lofs  of  our  liberty  and  in- 
dependence. For  if  with  the  aid  of  our  arms  Great-Britain  '.vere 
fubdued, — from  that  moment  (though  flattered  perhaps  with  the 
name  of  allies)  we  fliould  become  the  Provinces  of  France.  This  is 
a  refult  fo  obvious,  that  I  mull  crave  your  pardon  for  noticing  it. 
Some  advocates  of  Executive  meafures  admit  it.  They  acknowl- 
edge that  the  navy  of  Britain  is  our  (hield  againll  the  overwhelm- 
ing power  of  France. — Why  then  do  they  perfift  in  a  courfe  of 
condud  tending  to  a  rupture  with  Great- Britain  ? — Will  it  be 


» 


believed  that  it  is  principatly,  or  folely,  to  procure  inviolability  to 
the  merchant ^ag  of  the  United  States  \  In  other  words,  to  pro- 
tect all  feamen,  Br'tti/b  fuhjeltsy  as  well  as  our  own  citizens,  on 
board  our  merchant  veflels  >  It  is  a  faA  that  this  has  been  made 
the  greateft  obftacle  to  an  amicable  fettlement  with  Great-Britain. 
Yet  (I  repeat)  it  is  perfectly  well  known  that  (he  defires  to  obtain 
9mly  her  own  fuhjeds  ;  and  that  American  citizens,  imprefled  by 
miftake,  are  delivered  up  on  duly  authenticated  proof.  The  evil 
we  complain  of  arifes  from  the  impoflibiUty  of  always  diftinguiftiing 
the  perfpns  of  two  nations  who  a  few  years  fince  were  one  peo- 
ple, who  exhibit  the  fame  manners,  fpeak  the  fame  language,  and 
poiTefs  ilmilar  features.  But  feeing  that  we  feldom  hear  complaints 
in  the  great  navigating  States^  how  happens  there  to  be  fuch  ex- 
treme fympathy  for  American  feamen  at  IVaJbington  ?  Efpecially 
in  gentlemen  from  the  interiour  States,  which  have  no  feamen,  or 
from  thofe  Atlantick  States  whofe  native  feamen  bear  a  ver)'  fmall 
proportion  to  thofe  of  New-England  ?  In  faA,  the  caufes  of  com- 
plaint are  much  fewer  than  are  pretended.  They  rarely  occur  in 
the  States  whofe  feamen  are  chiefly  natives.  The  firft  merchant  in 
the  United  States,  in  anfwering  my  late  inquiry  about  Britifh  im- 
preflrnents,  fays,  •*  Since  the  Chefapeake  affair  we  have  had  no 
caufe  of  complaint.  I  cannot  find  one  fingle  inftance  where  they 
have  taken  one  man  out  of  a  merchant  veflel.  I  have  had  more 
than  twenty  vcfTels  arrived  in  that  time,  without  one  inftance  of  a 
man  being  taken  by  them.  Three  Sivedes  were  taken  out  by  a 
French  frigate.  I  have  made  inquiry  of  all  the  mafters  that  have 
arrived  in  this  vicinity,  and  cannot  find  any  complaints  againft  the 
Britiili  cruifers. ' 


.  'i'-im 


4 

Can  gentlemen  of  known  hofliVity  to  foreign  commerce  in  our  own 
vejfels — who  are  even  willing  to  annihilate  it  (and  fuch  there  are)— 
oan  thefe  gentlemen  plead  the  caufe  of  ouryrflmrn  becaufe  they  real- 
ly wi(h  to  proteS  them  ?  Can  thofe  defire  to  proteff  our  feamen,  who, 
by  laying  an  unneceflary  embargo,  expofe  them  by  thoufands  to 
ftarve  or  beg  ? — One  gentleman  has  faid  (and  I  believe  he  does  not 
ftand  alone)  that  fooner  than  admit  the  principle  that  Great- Brit- 
ain had  a  right  to  take  her  ownfuhjeBs  from  nnr  merchant  vefels,  he 


B 


>:iii': 


10 


■■& 


would  abandon  commerce  altogether  ! — To  what  will  every  man  in 
New-England  and  of  the  other  navigating  State8,  afcribe  fuch  a  fen- 
timent  ?  A  fentiment  which,  to  prevent  the  temporary  lofs  of  five 
men,  by  imprefs,  would  reduce  fifty  thoufand  to  beggary  ?  But  for 
the  Embargo,  thoufands  depending  on  the  ordinary  operations  of 
commerce,  would  now  be  employed.  Even  under  the  reftraints  of 
the  orders  of  the  Britifh  Government,  retaliating  the  French  im- 
perial decree,  very  large  portions  of  the  world  remain  open  to  the 
commerce  of  the  United  States.  We  may  yet  purfue  our  tiade 
with  the  Britifh  dominions,  in  every  part  of  the  globe  ;  with  Afri- 
ca, with  China,  and  with  the  colonics  of  France,  Spain,  and  Hol- 
land. And  let  me  afk,  whether  in  the  midll  of  a  profound  peace, 
when  the  powers  of  Europe  poffefllng  colonies,  would,  as  formerly, 
confine  the  trade  with  them  to  their  own  bottoms,  or  admit  us,  as 
foreigners,  only  under  gtoat  limitations,  we  could  enjoy  a  commerce 
much  more  extenfive  than  is  prafticable  at  this  moment,  if  the  Em- 
bargo were  not  in  the  way  ?  Why  then  fliould  it  be  continued  ? 
Why  rather  was  it  ever  laid  ?  Can  thofe  be  legitimate  reafons  for 
the  Embargo  which  are  concealed  from  Congrefs,  at  the  moment 
when  they  are  required  to  impofe  it  ?  Arc  the  reafons  to  be  found 
in  the  difpatches  from  Paris  ?  Thefe  have  been  moved  for ;  and 
the  motion  was  quafhed  by  the  advocates  for  the  Embargo.  Why 
are  thefe  difpatches  withhold  by  the  Executive  ?  Why,  when  all 
clafTes  of  citizens  anxioully  inquire  "  For  what  is  the  Embargo 
laid  ?"  is  a  fatisfa£lory  anfwer  denied  ?  Why  is  not  Congrefs  made 
acquainted  with  the  ad\ual  fituation  of  the  United  States  in  relation 
to  France  ?  Why,  in  this  dangerous  crifis,  are  Mr.  Armftrong's 
letters  to  the  Secretary  of  State  abfoluetly  withheld,  fo  that  a  line 
of  them  cannot  be  feen  ?  Did  they  contain  no  information  of  the 
demands  and  intentions  of  the  French  Emperor  ?  Did  the  Revenge 
fail  from  England  to  !•  ranee,  and  tliere  wait  three  or  four  weehs  foi- 
difpatches  of  no  importance  ?  If  fo,  why,  rcgardlefs  of  the  publick 
folicitude,  arc  their  contents  fo  carefully  concealed  ?  If  really  un- 
important, wiiat  harm  can  arife  from  telling  Congrefs  and  the  Na- 
tion, ojicially^  tiiat  they  contain  nothing  of  moment  to  tlie  fafcly, 
the  hberty,  the  honour,  or  the  intcreils  of  the  United  States  ?  On 
the  contrary,  arc  they  fo  clofely  locked  up  becaufe  they  will  not 


ia,y 


11 


bear  the  light  ?  Would  their  difclofure  roufe  the  fpirit  of  the  peo- 
ple, ilill  numbering  in  bHnd  confidence  in  the  Executive  ?  Has  the 
French  Emperor  declared  that  he  will  have  no  neutrals  ?  Has  he 
required  that  our  portsy  like  thofe  of  his  vafTal  ftates  in  Europe,  le 
Jhut  againjl  Briti/h  ommerce  ?  Is  the  Embargo  a  fubjiitutey  a  milder 
form  of  compliance  with  that  harfh  demand,  which  if  exhibited  in 
its  naked  and  infulting  afpeft,  the  American  fpirit  might  yet  re- 
fent  ?  Are  we  ftill  to  be  kept  profoundly  ignorant  of  the  declara- 
tions and  avowed  defigns  of  the  French  Emperor,  although  thefe 
may  ftnke  at  our  liberty  and  independence  ?  And,  in  the  mean 
time,  are  we,  by  a  thoufand  irritations,  by  cherifhing  prejudices,  and 
by  exciting  frefb  refentments,  to  he  drawn  gradually  into  a  war 
with  Great-Britain  ?  Why  amidil  the  extreme  anxiety  of  the  pub- 
lick  mind,  is  it  ftill  kept  on  the  rack  of  fearful  expeftation,  by  the 
Prefident's  portentous  filencc  refpeAing  his  French  difpatcbes  ? — 
In  this  concealment  there  is  d^i^^er.  In  this  concealment  muft  be 
wrapt  up  the  real  caufe  of  the  Embargo.  On  any  other  fuppoH- 
tion  it  is  inexplicable. 


I  am  alarmed.  Sir,  at  this  perilous  ftatc  of  things,  I  cannot  re- 
prefs  my  fufpicions  ;  or  forbear  thus  to  exhibit  to  you  the  grounds 
on  which  they  reft.  The  people  are  advifed  to  rcpofe  implicit 
confidence  in  the  National  Government  :  in  that  unbounded  confi- 
dence lies  our  danger.  Armed  with  that  confidence,  the  Execu- 
tive may  procure  the  adoption  of  meafures  which  may  overwhelm 
us  witli  ruin,  as  furely  as  if  he  had  an  army  at  his  heels.  By  falfe 
policy,  or  by  inordinate  fears,  our  country  may  be  betrayed  and 
fubjugatcd  to  France,  as  furely  as  by  corruption.  I  truft,  Sir,  that 
no  one  who  knows  me  will  charge  it  to  vanity  when  I  fay,  that  I 
have  fomc  knowledge  of  publick  men  and  of  publick  afTiiirs  :  and 
on  that  knowledge,  and  with  folemnity,  I  declare  to  you,  that  I 
have  no  confidence  in  the  wifdom  or  correftnefa  of  our  publick  meaf- 
ures  :  that  our  country  is  in  imminent  danger :  that  it  is  efTential 
to  the  publick  fafcty  that  the  blind  confidence  in  our  Rulers  ftiould 
ccalV  ;  that  the  State  Legiflaturos  fliould  know  tiie  fafts  and  rea- 
I'ons  on  which  important  general  laws  are  founiicd  ;  and  ifpeda'Iy 
that  ih'jfc  Staid  nvhoft  favnu  are  on  the  oceanp  and  ai'/jo/f  hariejls  are 


m 


gathered  in  every  feayjhould  immediately  and  ferioujly  confuler  honu  to 
preferve  them.  In  all  the  branches  of  Government,  commercial  in- 
formation is  wanting  ;  and  in  "  this  defert,"  called  a  city,  that 
want  cannot  be  fupplied.  Nothing  but  the  fenfe  of  the  commer- 
cial States,  clcarfy  and  emphatically  exprefled,  will  fave  them  from 
ruin. 

Are  our  thoufands  of  (hips  and  veflels  to  rot  in  our  harbours  ? 
Arc  our  fixty  thoufaud  feamen  and  fiftiermen  to  be  deprived  of  em- 
ployment,  and,  with  their  families,  reduced  to  want  and  beggary  ? 
Are  our  hundreds  of  thoufands  of  farmers  to  be  compelled  to  fuffer 
their  millions  in  furplus  produce  to  perifl\  on  their  handd  ;  that  the 
Prcfident  may  make  an  experiment  on  our  patience  and  fortitude, 
and  on  the  towering  pride,  the  boundlefs  ambition,  and  unyielding 
perfeverance  of  the  Conqueror  of  l.urope  ?  Sir,  I  have  reafon  to«be- 
lieve  that  thu  Prefidcnt  contemplates  the  continuance  of  the  Embar- 
go until  the  French  Emperor  repeals  his  decrees  violating  as  well 
his  treaty  with  the  United  States  as  every  neutral  right  ;  and  un- 
til Britain  thereupon  recals  her  retaliating  orders  ! — By  that  time 
we  may  have  neither  fliips  nor  feamen  :  and  that  is  pvecifely  the 
point  to  which  fome  men  wiHi  to  reduce  us. — To  fee  the  improvi- 
dence of  this  projeft  (to  call  it  by  no  harfher  name,  and  without  ad- 
verting to  ulterior  views)  let  us  lookback  to  former  years. 

Notvviiliftanding  the  well-founded  cqmplaints  of  fome  ividividuals, 
and  the  niurn)nr8  of  others ;  notwithilanding  the  frequent  Execu- 
tive decIarntioDS  of  maritime  ajjgrelTioiis  committed  hy  Great- Brit- 
ain ;  notwithilanding  tl>c  outrageous  decrees  of  France  and  Spain, 
and  the  wanton  ipoliations  pradifcd  and  executed  by  their  cruifcrs 
and  tribunals,  of  which  we  fumctimes  hear  a  faint  whifper  ; — the 
commerce  of  t!ic  United  States  has  hitherto  profpered  beyu;id  all 
ex:imj)le.  Ourcilizens  havr  accujnulated  wealth  ;  and  the  publick 
tcvoiiue,  annually  increafing,  has  been  the  Prefident's  annual  boast. 


Thefe  fafts  dimonflrate,  that  although  Great-Britain,  with  her 
thoufaiul  fliips  of  war,  conld  h;ive  dellroyed  our  commerce,  flie 
has  rcaiiy  done  it  no  elTentiai  injury  ;  and  that  the  other  bdiige^'iiti 


13 


heretofore  reftrained  by  fome  regard  to  National  Law,  and  liniit- 
ed  by  the  fmal)  "inber  of  their  cruifers,  have  not  inflicted  upon  it 
any  deep  wou  Yet  in  this  full  tide  of  fuccefs,  oiir  commerce  is 

fuddenly  arrelied  :  an  alarm  of  war  is  raifed  :  fearful  apprehcnllons 
are  excited  :  the  merchants,  in'  particular,  thrown  into  a  ftate  of 
confternation,  are  advifed,  by  a  voluntary  embargo,  to  keep  their 
vcflels  at  home.  And  what  is  the  caufe  of  this  mighty  but  mif- 
chievous  alarm  ?  We  know  it  in  its  whole*extent.  It  was  the  un- 
authorized attack  of  a  Briti/h  naval  officer  on  the  American  frigate 
Chefapeahey  to  fear ch  for  and  take  fome  deferters  known  to  have  been 
received  on  boards  who  had  been  often  demanded^  and  eu  often  refufedto 
be  delivered  up.  As  was  expedted  by  all  confiderate  men,  and  by 
the  Prcfident  himfelf  (as  I  have  before  obferved)  the  Britifh  Gov- 
ernment, on  the  firft  information  of  the  unfortunate  event  (and  with- 
out waiting  for  an  application)  difavowed  the  a£l  of  its  officer— dif- 
claimed  the  principle  of  fearching  National  armed  veflels — and  de- 
clared its  readinefs  to  make  fuitable  reparation,  as  foon  as  th^.  ilate 
of  the  cafe  (hould  be  fully  known. 


Under  fuch  circumftances,  who  can  juftify  this  alarm  of  war  ?  An 
alarm  which  greatly  difquieted  the  publick  mind,  and  occafioned 
an  interruption  of  commerce  extremely  injurious  to  our  merchant* 
and  fea-faring  citizens. 


I  will  clofo  this  long  letter  by  dating  all  the  exiding  pretences — 
for  there  are  no  caufce — for  a  war  with  Grcat«Britain. 


1.  The  Btitifh  fiiips  of  war,  agreeably  to  a  right  claimed  and  cx- 
ercifed  for  ages— a  right  claimed  and  cxcrcifed  during  the  whole  of 
the  admiiiillrations  of  Wafhington,  of  Adams,  and  of  Jcffcrfon, — 
rontinue  to  take  fome  of  the  BritHh  feamen  found  on  board  our 
merchant  vefTda,  and  with  them  a  fundi  number  of  ou-s,  from  the 
impoflibihty  of  always  dillinguilhing  EiigHflitncn  from  citizens  of 
the  United  States.  Oii  this  point  our  Government  well  know 
that  Great-Biitain  is  perfctlly  willing  to  adopt  any  arrangement 
that  can  be  devifed,  which  will  fccurc  to  her  fervice  the  fnmcn  who 
mc  her  awti  fiiljecit ;  and  at  the  fame  time  exempt  ouis  from  imprell- 
ment. 


m 


14 


2.  The  merchant  veffels  of  Fiance,  Spain  and  Holland,  being 
driven  from  the  ocean,  or  deftroyed,  the  commerce  of  thofe  countries 
with  one  another,  and  with  their  colonies,  could  no  longer  be  carri- 
ed on  by  themfelves.  Here  the  veffels  of  neutral  nations  came  in 
to  their  aid,  and  carried  on  nearly  the  whole  commerce  of  thofe  na- 
tions. With  their  feamen  thus  liberated  from  the  merchant  fer- 
vice,  thofe  nations,  in  th*  prefent  and  preceding  wars,  were  enabled 
to  man  their  (hips  of  war ;  and  the  neutral  vcifels  and  feamen  fup- 
plying  their  places,  became  in  fa^j  though  not  in  name,  auxiliaries 
in  war.  The  commerce  of  thofe  nations,  without  one  armed  fliip 
on  the  fea  appropriated  for  its  protection,  was  intended  thus  to  be 
fecured  under  neutral  flags  ;  while  the  merchant  veffels  of  Great- 
Britain,  with  its  numerous  armed  (hips  to  guard  them,  were  cxpof- 
cd  to  occafional  captures. — Such  a  courfe  of  things  Great- Britain 
has  refifted,  not  in  tlie  prefent  only,  but  in  former  wars  ;  at  lead 
as  far  back  as  that  of  1756.  And  flie  has  claimed  and  main- 
tained a  right  to  impofe  on  this  commerce  fome  limits  and  rc- 
ftraints  ;  becaufe  it  was  a  commerce  which  was  denied  by  thofe  na- 
tions  to  neutrals  in-times  of  peace  ;  bccaufc  it  was  a  commerce  of 
immenfe  value  to  the  fubjefts  of  her  enemies  ;  and  becaufe  it  filled 
their  treafuries  with  money  to  enable  them  to  carry  on  their  wars 
with  Great-Britain. 


H 


3.  The  third  and  only  remaining  pretence  for  war  with  Great- 
Britain,  is  the  unfortunate  affair  of  the  Chefapeake  ;  winch  having 
been  already  ftated  and  explained,  I  will  only  remark  here,  that  it  is 
not  to  be  believed  that  the  Britifh  Government,  after  boing  defeated, 
as  before  mentioned,  in  its  endeavours  to  make  reparation  in  Lon- 
don, for  the  wrong  done  by  its  fervant,  would  have  fent  hither  a 
fpecial  envoy  to  give  honourable  fatisfaftion ,  but  from  its  fiiicere  de- 
firc  to  clofe  this  wound,  if  our  own  Government  nuouldfiiffcr  it  to  Ir 
healed. 


Permit  me  now  to  alk,  what  man,  impartially  viewing  the  fub- 
joct,  will  have  the  holdiiefs  to  fay  that  then-  exifts  any  caufe  for 
plunging  the  United  States  into  a  war  with  Great-Uritain  ?  Who 
that  refuedls  his  reputation  a*  a  man  of  common  difcernment  v.iU 


15 


£ay  it  ?  Who  that  regards  the  interefts  and  welfare  of  his  country 
will  fay  it  ?  Who  then  can  juftify,  who  can  find  an  excufe  for  a 
courfe  of  conduft  which  has  brought  our  country  into  its  prefent 
ftatc  of  alarm,  embarraffment  and  diftreft,  ?  For  myfelf,  Sir,  I  mull 
declare  the  opinion,  that  no  free  country  was  ever  before  fo  caufe- 
Icfsly,  and  fo  blindly,  thrown  from  the  height  of  profperity,  and 
plunged  into  a  ftate  of  dreadful  anxiety  and  fuffering.  But  from 
this  degraded  and  wretched  fituation  it  is  not  yet  too  late  to  efcape. 
Let  the  difpatches  from  our  Minifter  in  France  be  no  longer  con- 
cealed. liCt  the  Prefident  perform  the  duty  required  of  him  by 
the  Conftitution  ;  by  giving  to  Congrch  full  information  ofthejlate 
of  the  unwn  in  refpoA  tu  fureign  nations.  Above  all,  let  him  unfold 
our  atlual  fituation  with  France.  Let  him  tell  us  what  are  the  de- 
mands and  propofals  of  her  Ruler.  Had  thefe  been  honourable  to 
the  United  States,  would  not  the  Prefident  have  been  eager  to  dif- 
clofe  them  ?  that  they  are  of  an  entirely  diiTerent  nature,  that  they 
are  rlifhonourahle,  that  they  are  ruinous  to  our  commercial  interefis,  and 
dangerous  to  our  liberty  and  independencCf  we  are  left  to  infer. 


I  hope  Sir,  that  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  the  fubjeft  will 
furnifli  a  fufficient  apology  for  the  length  and  ftyle  of  this  letter. 
Perhaps  feme  may  deem  it  prefumptuous  thus  to  queftion  the  cor- 
reftnefs  of  the  proceedings  of  our  Government.  A  ftrong  fenfe  of 
duty,  and  diftreffing  apprehenfions  of  National  ruin,  have  forced  the 
taflc  upon  me.  To  fome  the  fentiments  which,  in  the  fincerity  of 
my  heart,  I  have  expreflcd,  may  give  offence  :  for  often  nothing 
offends  fo  much  as  truth.  Yet  I  do  not  dcfire  to  offend  any  man. 
lUit  when  I  fee  the  dangerous  extent  of  Executive  influence  :  when 
I  foe  the  Great  Council  of  the  Nation  called  on  to  enaft  laws  deep- 
ly affei^ing  the  interefts  of  all  clafTes  of  citizens,  without  adequate 
information  of  the  reafoiis  of  that  call  :  when  I  obferve  the  decep- 
tive gloflfs  with  which  the  mifchiefs  of  the  Embargo  are  attempt- 
ed to  be  palliated  ;  and  p'flirior  events  adduced  ar.  rcafons  to  juftify 
the  meafure  :  when  I  know  that  tlie  rifles  of  continuing  their  com- 
mercial purfuits  aj:jainft  all  Itwwn  diingers  can  and  will  be  more  ac- 
curately calculated  by  our  mercliaiHs  than  by  our  Government  : 
when  if  anv  tic-.o   dun^rrs   t<n  commerce  were  impondinjj,  of  which 


iUljrf 


16 

our  merchants  were  uninformed,  but  of  which  the  Government  ob- 
tained the  knowledge  through  its  Miniller  at  Paris,  or  elf^where, 
it  was  plainly  the  duty  of  the  Executive  to  make  thofe  dangers 
known  to  Congrefs  and  the  Nation  :  and  fuice  if  fo  made  known, 
the  merchants  and  fea-faring  citizens  would,  for  their  own  interefti 
and  fafety,  have  taken  due  precautions  to  guard  againll  them  :  and 
M  it  hence  appears  certain  that  an  Embargo  was  not  neceffary  to 
the  fafety  of  "  our  feamen,  our  veflels,  or  our  merchandize  :''— 
when,  Sir,  I  fee  and  confider  thcfe  things,  and  their  evil  tendency  : 
in  a  word,  when  I  obfer\'e  a  courfe  of  proceeding  which  to  me  ap- 
pears calculated  to  miflcad  the  publick  mind  to  publick  ruin  ;  I  can- 
,.1,  not  be  lilent.      Regardlefa,   tlicrefare,   of  pcrfonnl  confequencet,  I 

have  undertaken  to  communicate  thefe  details  ;  with  the  view  to 
diflipate  dangerous  illufions  ;  to  give  to  my  Conilituents  correft  in- 
formation ;  to  excite  inqtiiry  ;  and  to  roufe  that  vigilant  jealoufy 
which  is  charaaeriftick  of  REPUBLICANS,  and  effential  to  the 
prefervation  of  their  rights,  their  liberties,  and  their  independence. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

very  refpeftfully, 
^-v  Sir, 

Your  obedient  Servant, 

TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

His  Excellency  JAMES   SULLIVAN, 

Gtvermr  of  the  Commontuealth  of  MaJfachufeUs. 


"^^-- 


